25019
Imagining Counterfactual Worlds in Autism Spectrum Disorder
Counterfactual reasoning is an important part of social communication and may be a necessary precondition for development of Theory of Mind. Counterfactual reasoning relies on both imaginative and inhibitory processes, both of which may be impaired in people with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Limited previous research has found counterfactual reasoning ability to be impaired in children with ASD, but this has never been explored in adults. Past research has also relied on the generation of counterfactual statements or responses to counterfactual reasoning questions, which create ambiguous task demands for people with ASD. Exploring counterfactual reasoning ability with online processing measures eliminates this potential confound.
Objectives:
We present four eye-tracking experiments (experiments 1 and 2 complete; approximately 50% of data collected for 3 and 4) that explore the processing of counterfactual sentences, requiring differing levels of inhibition and imagination, in individuals with ASD and typically developing (TD) participants in an anomaly detection reading task.
Methods:
Experiment 1 depicted everyday events that incur a minimal change from reality (e.g. “If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry/wet…”). Experiment 2 described alternative versions of known historical events that require readers to suspend their knowledge of reality and imagine a novel version of the world (e.g. “If Spain were not a member of the European Union, they would pay for things using Pesetas/Euros…”). Experiment 3 presented completely novel scenarios requiring a high degree of imagination (e.g. “If margarine contained soap, mum could use margarine in her washing/baking…”). Experiment 4 explored the processing of counterfactual sentences within well-known fictional worlds (e.g. “If Harry Potter lost his magic powers, he would use his broom to sweep/fly…”). Factual contexts (“Because…”) provided a baseline measure of contextual integration.
Results:
Results from Experiments 1 and 2 (n=50) revealed similar comprehension strategies for TD and ASD groups (faster counterfactual inconsistency-detection in Experiment 2 than 1). However, relative to controls, participants with ASD were faster to detect the factual inconsistency in Experiment 1, and were more likely to regress back to aid comprehension of a counterfactual world in Experiment 2.
Preliminary results suggest similar findings for Experiments 3 and 4 (n=20). For example, in Experiment 3, adults with ASD demonstrated typical counterfactual processing with faster detection of anomalies within factual than counterfactual sentences, with some evidence suggesting slower counterfactual processing in Experiment 4.
Conclusions:
Overall, our results across experiments (and two different samples) suggest that adults with ASD are well-able to process counterfactual sentences and do so in a similar time course to TD adults, even when these sentences place demands on imagination and inhibition. This implies that difficulties with Theory of Mind in adults with ASD are not the result of counterfactual processing deficits. However, some subtle between group differences were found when counterfactual processing required inhibitory control. Adults with ASD appeared slower to process counterfactual scenarios requiring inhibition of prior knowledge (whether factual e.g. the Titanic sinking, or fictional e.g. that mermaids have tails). The theoretical and clinical implications of this will be discussed.