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Thursday, May 7, 2009
Northwest Hall (Chicago Hilton)
1:30 PM
Background:
Poor imaginative abilities are a central feature of children with high functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASD). Imagination has been linked to key aspects of cognitive development such as false belief reasoning (reasoning about beliefs that are false) and counterfactual reasoning (reasoning about events that are false). However, few studies have looked at the functional use of imagination in these domains of cognitive development in HFASD. The current study focused on the development of imagination and its use in counterfactual and false belief reasoning of children with high functioning HFASD. Objectives:
To investigate the development of the use of imagination in additive (‘If only I had done…’) and subtractive (‘If only I had not done….’) counterfactuals and false belief reasoning of children with HFASD and typically developing controls, aged 6 to 12 years (n=147), using a cross sectional design of three age cohorts.
Methods:
Children with HFASD (n=76) and typical development (n=71), matched on mental and chronological age, were divided equally over age cohorts of 6-8, 8-10 and 10-12 year olds. Children were presented four stories where they could generate additive and subtractive counterfactuals based on a given consequent (e.g., 'you play in the mud, and then leave muddy footprints all over the kitchen. How could that event have been prevented?'). Furthermore, generative imaginative ability was investigated using an ideational fluency task, and false belief reasoning was tested with a second order false belief task.
Results:
The HFASD group performed more poorly than controls on the false belief and ideational fluency tasks, but not on the counterfactual task. However, a Group*Age*Direction interaction suggested distinct developmental patterns in HFASD and controls. Children with HFASD increasingly used subtractive counterfactuals as they got older. In contrast, typically developing controls showed an increase in additive counterfactuals. Moreover, false belief reasoning was correlated to subtractive counterfactual reasoning in the HFASD group, and to additive counterfactual reasoning in the control groups.
Conclusions:
The opposite developmental patterns of additive and subtractive counterfactual reasoning in children with HFASD and typical development suggest contrasting learning effects. The increase in additive counterfactual reasoning of typically developing children may be linked to their growing adaptive and flexible skills, both cognitive and behavioural. Children with HFASD likely develop different strategies, as evidenced by the link between subtractive counterfactual abilities and false belief reasoning. The role of IQ and ideational fluency will be discussed.
Poor imaginative abilities are a central feature of children with high functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASD). Imagination has been linked to key aspects of cognitive development such as false belief reasoning (reasoning about beliefs that are false) and counterfactual reasoning (reasoning about events that are false). However, few studies have looked at the functional use of imagination in these domains of cognitive development in HFASD. The current study focused on the development of imagination and its use in counterfactual and false belief reasoning of children with high functioning HFASD. Objectives:
To investigate the development of the use of imagination in additive (‘If only I had done…’) and subtractive (‘If only I had not done….’) counterfactuals and false belief reasoning of children with HFASD and typically developing controls, aged 6 to 12 years (n=147), using a cross sectional design of three age cohorts.
Methods:
Children with HFASD (n=76) and typical development (n=71), matched on mental and chronological age, were divided equally over age cohorts of 6-8, 8-10 and 10-12 year olds. Children were presented four stories where they could generate additive and subtractive counterfactuals based on a given consequent (e.g., 'you play in the mud, and then leave muddy footprints all over the kitchen. How could that event have been prevented?'). Furthermore, generative imaginative ability was investigated using an ideational fluency task, and false belief reasoning was tested with a second order false belief task.
Results:
The HFASD group performed more poorly than controls on the false belief and ideational fluency tasks, but not on the counterfactual task. However, a Group*Age*Direction interaction suggested distinct developmental patterns in HFASD and controls. Children with HFASD increasingly used subtractive counterfactuals as they got older. In contrast, typically developing controls showed an increase in additive counterfactuals. Moreover, false belief reasoning was correlated to subtractive counterfactual reasoning in the HFASD group, and to additive counterfactual reasoning in the control groups.
Conclusions:
The opposite developmental patterns of additive and subtractive counterfactual reasoning in children with HFASD and typical development suggest contrasting learning effects. The increase in additive counterfactual reasoning of typically developing children may be linked to their growing adaptive and flexible skills, both cognitive and behavioural. Children with HFASD likely develop different strategies, as evidenced by the link between subtractive counterfactual abilities and false belief reasoning. The role of IQ and ideational fluency will be discussed.