Lie-Telling, Theory of Mind, and Verbal Ability in Children with ASD

Background:

The ability to tell lies requires understanding that others may have mental states that differ from one’s own and that mental states drive behaviour. Though many studies have demonstrated that individuals with ASD have a deficit in ToM, researchers have just begun to examine lie-telling abilities in individuals with ASD. Furthermore, many studies have found a relation between ToM and language (e.g., Fisher, Happé, & Dunn, 2005); however, no published studies to date have considered the possible contribution of verbal ability when examining the relation between ToM and lie-telling in children with ASD.

Objectives:

The purpose of this study is to examine the interrelations among lie-telling behaviours, ToM understanding, and verbal ability in children with ASD.

Methods:

Our preliminary sample (testing is ongoing) consists of 24 TD children (CA: M = 7.17, SD = .72; VMA: M = 7.59, SD = 1.30) and 10 children with ASD (CA: M = 8.07, SD = 1.12; VMA: M = 7.48, SD = 1.32). Antisocial lie-telling is assessed using a temptation resistance paradigm (Talwar & Lee, 2002) in which children are asked not to peek at a toy while the experimenter leaves the room and then asked upon the experimenter’s return if they peeked at the toy. They are also asked questions to examine their ability to maintain consistency between their lie and subsequent statements (i.e., semantic leakage control). Prosocial lie-telling is assessed using a modified version of Talwar, Murphy, and Lee’s (2007) undesirable gift paradigm in which children receive a disappointing prize from the experimenter and are asked if they like their prize.

ToM understanding and verbal ability are assessed using a battery of standard first- and second-order false belief (FB) tasks and the core battery of the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals–Fourth Edition, respectively.

Results:

Based on the 14 TD children and 7 children with ASD that peeked at the toy, the groups do not differ on antisocial lie-telling and semantic leakage control. Surprisingly, children with ASD may be more likely than TD children to tell prosocial lies (χ²(1) = 3.52, p = .06).

Verbal ability in children with ASD is not correlated with first-order FB understanding, but it is correlated with second-order FB understanding (r(10) = .70, p = .02). It was hypothesized that lie-telling would be correlated with ToM understanding and verbal ability in children with ASD; however, due to the lack of variability in the current sample—100% of peekers told antisocial lies and 100% of children told prosocial lies—this hypothesis remains to be tested. Semantic leakage control is correlated with ToM understanding in TD children (r(12) = .60, p = .04); however, it is not correlated with ToM understanding or verbal ability in children with ASD.

Conclusions:

Our preliminary findings demonstrate that high-functioning children with ASD have little difficulty telling antisocial and prosocial lies, which suggests they may have at least a rudimentary ToM. However, children with ASD may be using different processes than TD children when deciding when and how to deceive others.