Self-Referential Metacognition in Adolescents with ASD Learning Mathematics

Background:

Theory of mind has been argued to comprise of two distinct sets of processes: an understanding of one’s own mental states (self-referential metacognition) and the mental states of others (other-referential mindreading). A wealth of research has focused upon deficits in the appreciation of the mental states of other people (‘mindreading’) in ASD, yet there is little research has explored whether this deficit extends to an appreciation of their own mental states (‘metacognition’). The limited research to date suggests that children and adults with ASD can have deficits in metacognition and it has been argued that metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in ASD. One area that metacognition has been found to be highly predictive is with respect to learning performance (more predictive than IQ). As an example, knowing we have made an error ourselves (metacognitive awareness) can be important for responding appropriately (metacognitive regulation) to guide future learning.

Objectives:

To identify if learners of mathematics with ASD have impairment in metacognition, specifically: 1) knowing when they have made an error (metacognitive awareness); and 2) when an error has been made, thinking that they meant to make the error (metacognitive regulation). 

Methods:

This study explored metacognitive awareness and regulation in 21 males with ASD and 16 typically developing male controls who were being educated at the same level. An index of IQ (WASI-UK, Wechsler, 1999) was also taken for the ASD sample. Verbal IQ ranged from 63 to 108 (mean = 89.69, sd=10.59) and performance IQ ranged from 60 to 126 (mean = 96.42, sd = 16.46). Participants were asked a series of fifteen mathematics questions. Based upon previous research, after each question they were asked two metacognitive questions: 1) whether they thought they had got the answer correct or not (or ‘don’t know’) and, 2) whether they meant to get the answer correct or not (or ‘don’t know’).

Results:

Participants with ASD were significantly more likely than the typically developing group to erroneously think that they had got an incorrect answer correct. Having made an error, those with ASD were also significantly more likely to report that they had meant to make an error. Different patterns in the types of errors made were also identified between the two groups.

Conclusions:

Deficits in metacognitive awareness and regulation were identified for the ASD group in the learning of mathematics. This is consistent with metacognitive research from different contexts. Interventions based upon developing metacognitive skills have been found to be highly beneficial within the typically developing population and should be evaluated for those on the autism spectrum who may have specific metacognitive deficits.