The Relation Between Theory of Mind and Self-Perceptions in Adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorders

Background:

Research has demonstrated that, despite problems in multiple domains, children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) show a lack of awareness of their difficulties (e.g., Johnson & Filliter, & Murphy, 2009). This lack of awareness may make it difficult for individuals to adjust their behaviour in accordance with feedback, leading to greater impairments over time. Much of this research on individuals with ASD has utilized discrepancy analyses from parental reports on abstract measures. However, it is possible that these overly-inflated self-perceptions may be a result of rater bias on part of the parent or due to the participants’ inability to understand abstract criteria.

While there is a growing body of literature examining positively-biased self-perceptions in individuals with ASD, little research has focused on examining mechanisms underlying this phenomenon. Theorists suggest that the same cognitive mechanisms required for attributing thoughts and feelings to others are the same as those required for attributing and reflecting one’s own mental states (Frith & Happé, 1999). Therefore it is possible that deficits in theory-of-mind (ToM) abilities may be related to positively-biased self-perceptions in ASD. 

Objectives:

1. To extend research on self-perceptions held by adolescents with ASD using a novel methodology, which aims to eliminate potential biases.
2. To investigate ToM as a possible underlying causal mechanism related to positively-biased self-perceptions.

Methods:

Forty-one participants, 19 with ASD and 22 typically-developing control (TD) adolescents (age range =12-18 years), participated. Self-report questions were utilized after participants completed two academic-type tasks. Participants were asked how well they thought they did prior to completing the tasks (pre-task prediction). After they completed each task they were asked how well they thought they did (immediate post-performance) and how well they thought they would do in the future (hypothetical future post-performance). Difference scores between actual performance and predicted performance were used to assess self-perceptions. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) was used to assesse ToM abilities.  

 Results:

Results indicated that the ASD group had more positively-biased self-perceptions on all three measures (pre-task prediction, immediate and hypothetical future post-performance), compared to TD controls. In the ASD group, ToM abilities were significantly correlated to the pre-task prediction question.

Conclusions:

Examining self-perceptions in ASD, using a concrete and objective measure, furthers our understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying this phenomenon. Results suggest that individuals with ASD who have greater ToM abilities have more accurate pre-task predictions. Pre-task predictions tend to be global in nature, as participants must recall similar past experiences and create a concept based on these experiences. Post-performance ratings are based on more concrete experiences, as participants’ have already completed the task. It is possible that ToM abilities are more directly related to these global types of questions. Deeper understanding of the mechanisms that underlie this phenomenon will not only help us understand more about these positively-biased self-perceptions and why they exist, but may also inform the development of intervention strategies.