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Saturday, May 17, 2008
Champagne Terrace/Bordeaux (Novotel London West)
Background: Theory of Mind deficit is one of the most influent theoretical explanations of autistic symptoms. Poor performances in false belief tasks (FBT) have been widely observed in subjects with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD), and are one essential argument for this account. However, the paradox of high-functioning subjects with ASD passing FBT has led to a dual-processing explanation of belief representation including two hypotheses:
(1) An intuitive processing of beliefs in normal subjects and
(2) A deficit of this intuitive processing in autistics, with compensatory verbal reasoning in high-functioning subjects (Happé 1995).
However, contrary to (1), other authors (Newton & de Villiers 2007) argue that verbal reasoning may be essential in representing beliefs in all subjects.
Objectives: In order to test (1), we aimed to set apart the roles of intuitions and reasoning in representing beliefs in normal adults.
Methods: We used verbal shadowing to inhibit reasoning, during a series of forced choice non verbal false belief tasks based on animated cartoons, in 20 healthy adults.
Results: Data obtained on normal subjects indicate that performance is only partly dependant on verbal reasoning.
Conclusions: Consistent with the first hypothesis of the dual-processing explanation of belief representation, normal adults remain able to process mental states despite heavy verbal interference to their reasoning. Data on adults with Asperger syndrome are currently being collected to test the second hypothesis: the compensatory role of verbal reasoning in high-functioning subjects with ASD.
(1) An intuitive processing of beliefs in normal subjects and
(2) A deficit of this intuitive processing in autistics, with compensatory verbal reasoning in high-functioning subjects (Happé 1995).
However, contrary to (1), other authors (
Objectives: In order to test (1), we aimed to set apart the roles of intuitions and reasoning in representing beliefs in normal adults.
Methods: We used verbal shadowing to inhibit reasoning, during a series of forced choice non verbal false belief tasks based on animated cartoons, in 20 healthy adults.
Results: Data obtained on normal subjects indicate that performance is only partly dependant on verbal reasoning.
Conclusions: Consistent with the first hypothesis of the dual-processing explanation of belief representation, normal adults remain able to process mental states despite heavy verbal interference to their reasoning. Data on adults with Asperger syndrome are currently being collected to test the second hypothesis: the compensatory role of verbal reasoning in high-functioning subjects with ASD.